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In recent decades, the distinction between justification and ex-
cuse defenses has been a favorite topic of theorists of philosophy
and criminal law. Paul Robinson offers this representative general
definition:
Justified conduct adheres to the criminal law's rules of con-
duct and is to be encouraged (or at least tolerated) in similar
circumstances in the future.... An excuse, in contrast, repre-
sents a legal conclusion that the conduct is wrong and
undesirable, that the conduct ought not to be tolerated and
ought to be avoided in the future, even in the same situation.
Criminal liability nonetheless is inappropriate because some
characteristic of the actor or the actor's situation vitiates the
actor's blameworthiness.
Scholars, notably including Reid Fontaine, whose article2 is the sub-
ject of this Symposium, vigorously debate whether duress, heat of
passion mitigation4 and other defenses5 are justifications or excuses
as a general matter.
t © 2009 by GabrielJ. Chin. All rights reserved.
* Chester H. Smith Professor of Law, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College
of Law. Email: gchin@aya.yale.edu. Warm thanks to Dan Markel, Marc Miller and Peter
Westen for generous and helpful comments on an earlier draft. I am particularly grateful to
Reid Fontaine for our many discussions on these and related issues, which led to an invita-
tion to participate in this Symposium.
1. PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 9.1, at 479 (1997); see also, e.g., Peter Westen, An
Attitudinal Theory of Excuse, 25 LAW & PHIL. 289, 325 (2006) (arguing that most commenta-
tors assume "that justification stands for conduct that is right and good (or at least not
wrong and bad), and that excuse stands for conduct that is wrongful but blameless.").
2. Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse Not
Justification, 43 U. MICH.J.L. REFORss 27 (2009).
3. Compare Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justfica-
tion, Not an Excuse--and Why it Matters, 6 BUFF. CRI1N. L. REv. 833 (2003), with Kyron
Huigens, Commentary, Duress is Not aJustification, 2 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 303 (2004).
4. See Reid Griffith Fontaine, Disentangling the Psychology and Law of Instrumental and
Reactive Subtypes ofAggression, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 143, 147 n.6 (2007).
5. Reid Griffith Fontaine, An Attack on Self-Defense, 47 AN. CRiM. L. REV. (forthcoming
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfin?abstractid=1275858 (noting
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The distinction is important as a matter of legal philosophy, be-
cause it describes reasons for withholding criminal liability.
7
Howeve; as Professor Westen writes, "[t]he measure of any inter-
nally-consistent distinction between justification and excuse is its
usefulness."' Its utility to the criminal justice system-to judges, ju-
ries, legislatures, law students and lawyers-has not yet been
demonstrated. 9
Principally at stake is the distinction's potential (rather than cur-
rent) utility to the criminal justice system. The justification/excuse
distinction plays no significant role in contemporary criminal doc-
trine.0 For example, the legal consequence of a successful defense
that categorization has been controversial with defenses of provocation, duress, self-defense,
mistake of fact and insanity).
6. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN
CRIMINAL LAW 263-98 (2007); Marcia Baron, Justifications and Excuses, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM1. L.
387 (2005). Some are more skeptical of the value of the distinction. See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Re-
thinking justifications, 39 TULSA L. REV. 829, 829 (2004) ("[W]hen one looks at the
apparently interminable and irresoluble controversies that surround the topic ... one must
begin to wonder just what of substance is at stake and how far the substantive issues may be
concealed or distorted, rather than being illuminated ... by such a determined focus on the
question of what counts as a 'justification' or as an 'excuse.''); Douglas Husak, On the Sup-
posed Priority ofJustification to Excuse, 24 LAW & PHIL. 557, 557 (2005) ("Few nontrivial claims
about this distinction have attracted anything that approximates a consensus among legal
philosophers.").
7. Just because something is an important reason for withholding criminal liability
(factual innocence, for example) does not mean that it should or can be tested for directly.
8. Westen, supra note 1, at 328.
9. This Essay addresses the situations in which other scholars claim the distinction is
important. The main sources include JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
§ 17.05 (4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW]; Joshua
Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1349 n.124 (1989); Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review
of the Concepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1168 n.47 (1987) [hereinafter
Dressier, Justications and Excuses] (citing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW
(1978) [hereinafter FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW]; George P. Fletcher, Rights and
Excuses, 3 CRIM.JUsT. ETHICS 17 (1984) [hereinafter Fletcher, Rights and Excuses]; George P.
Fletcher, Commentary, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a Justification or an Excuse
for Escape?, 26 UCIA L. REV. 1355 (1979) [hereinafter Fletcher, Should Intolerable Prison Con-
ditions]; Patti H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm us a Prerequisite for Criminal
Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266 (1975)); Joshua Dressier, New Thoughts About the Concept of
Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UClA L.
REV. 61, 61 n.2 (1984) [hereinafter Dressier, New Thoughts].
10. This point is illustrated in the authoritative treatise by Paul Robinson, which in
Sections 31-39 (discussing "practical implications" of classification of defenses) focuses
primarily on arguments and proposals for law reform, rather than setting out existing dis-
tinctions based on the justification/excuse distinction. 1 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW
DEFENSES §§ 31-39 (1984) (claiming that his arguments "demonstrate that some sort of
overall conceptual organization of criminal law defenses is possible, that properly defined
such a scheme can be logically sound and can bring conceptual clarity to a troubled area,
and that within such a scheme lies the resolution of a host of thorny practical problems.");
see also, e.g., United States v. Jumah, 493 F.3d 868, 874 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007) ("The principal
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in an individual case does not turn on whether it is a justification11
or excuse; any complete defense ends a prosecution. There are
no general rules applicable to justifications that do not apply to
excuses (or vice versa), say, with regard to allocation or nature of
the burden of proof, or the mitigating effect of a failed defense at
sentencing.
12
Nevertheless, Joshua Dressier, Paul Robinson and other major
contributors to this debate assert that categorizing defenses cor-
rectly is important because whether a defense is classified as a
justification or an excuse should affect the outcome in particular
cases or shape other aspects of the criminal justice system. This
claim is initially plausible. Some defense classifications are clearly
important to the outcomes of criminal cases. For example, it mat-
ters whether a defense is complete or partial, affirmative or
ordinary, constitutionally mandated or potentially subject to aboli-
tion by a court or legislature. It is also true that moral philosophy
and jurisprudence are often relevant to criminal law doctrine, be-
cause persuasive arguments may affect decision makers'
criminalization of particular conduct or lead to other rule changes
to conform the law to principles of justice. But when attempting to
identify precisely how the justification/excuse distinction, in itself,
suggests anything about how cases should be disposed of in actual
court systems, the question becomes more problematic.
A general warning sign suggesting that the concepts might be
difficult to apply in a legal system is the broad scholarly dissensus
about what they mean. If experts disagree about definitions and
concepts, those definitions and concepts may also be difficult for
lay jurors and non-academic lawyers. Scholars disagree about the
concepts of justification and excuse in multiple dimensions. They
distinction between justification and excuse lies in the concerns animating the affirmative
defense.").
11. See, e.g., State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 815 (N.D. 1983) ("The distinction is
arguably superfluous because whether a person's belief is correct and his conduct justified,
or whether it is merely reasonable and his conduct excused, the end result is the same,
namely, the person avoids punishment for his conduct."); ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 9.1, at
479 ('justifications and excuses are similar in that both are general defenses and both ex-
culpate the actor because of his or her blamelessness.").
12. In non-capital sentencing, courts seem to consider as potential mitigation both jus-
tification and excuse "defenses" that failed or were incomplete at trial. See, e.g., United States
v. One Star, 9 F.3d 60 (8th Cir. 1993) (fact that firearm was possessed for self-defense war-
ranted downward departure); Hines v. State, 817 So. 2d 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (jury
rejection of self-defense did not preclude consideration at sentencing); Smith v. State, 532
So. 2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (mental illness falling short of defense could be consid-
ered at sentencing); Westlake v. State, 893 N.E.2d 769 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (same). Since
anything can be argued as mitigation in capital sentencing, e.g., Buchanan v. Angelone, 522
U.S. 269, 276 (1998), the fact that both justification and excuse evidence is admissible is not
particularly probative.
Unjustified
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disagree at the conceptual level whether justification is defined
objectively or subjectively (and therefore whether reasonably mis-
taken justification is justification or excuse), and, if objectively,
whether "unknowing justification" is either the superior defense of
justification or, instead, no defense at all. 3
Scholars also disagree about categorization as justification or ex-
cuse of many individual defenses, including duress, provocation,
and others. 4 Yet, scholars recognize that defenses they categorize
as excuses can be satisfied by conduct fitting the definition of justi-
fication-and vice versa.'l In addition, fact-finding using these
concepts may require determining what would actually have hap-
pened in the future if circumstances had been different, and what
third parties were actually thinking at relevant times in the past.
Some versions differentiate between actual threats of harm and
mere reasonable appearances of threat that did not actually exist.
To apply these distinctions, juries must determine the actual inten-
tions and future plans of, say, a perceived arsonist shot dead while
reaching for the match.
Notwithstanding the impressive intellectual efforts devoted to
the task, no single scholar or viewpoint appears to be on the verge
of generating practical consensus about the concepts of justifica-
tion and excuse, categorization of the defenses, or categorization
of difficult individual cases. Justification and excuse, then, will
likely remain contested and controversial in broad concept, in in-
dividual cases, and at the intermediate level of particular defenses.
In addition, adjudicating specific cases appears to require extraor-
dinary fact-finding capabilities. Any legal system must pause before
making its most important decisions rest on precise application of
concepts that lack accepted definitions and appear difficult, per-
haps impossible, to administer.
Advocates of the distinction make three main claims for the im-
portance of developing and elaborating the justification/excuse
distinction: that it 1) could with feasible changes in the law send
clear moral messages about the disposition of criminal charges,
particularly "not guilty" verdicts; 2) now shapes third party and ac-
complice liability; and 3) should be used to generate procedural
rules, such as with respect to the burden of proof, for categories of
defenses. This Essay, building on important and largely unan-
13. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 95-124
(1997).
14. See supra notes 3-5 and accompan)ing text.
15. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
16. Cf Peter M. Tiersma, AskingJurors to Do the Impossible (Loyola Law Sch. L.A., Legal
Studies Paper No. 2009-12, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352093.
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swered criticisms by Mitchell Berman 17 and Kent Greenawalt,"5 sug-
gests that none of these goals can be usefully advanced through the
justification/excuse distinction. Accordingly, there is, so far, no
convincing support for the idea that the distinction is important to
the structure or operation of the legal system.
Part I proposes that defenses need not be categorized and la-
beled as precisely as crimes, either for jurisprudential or for
practical purposes. Because the various crimes have different pun-
ishments and moral implications, they must be precisely defined in
general and carefully ascribed in particular cases. By contrast, all
non-convictions have identical punishment and the same criminal
implications, and rest on the same general ground-given the pro-
cedural structure, there is insufficient evidence of guilt.
Accordingly, functionally, a single category of acquittals is both ac-
curate and sufficient. Subcategories may be of interest for various
reasons, but do not have functions, and thus do not present the
same compelling practical need for sensible sub-categorization as
does, say, "homicide." A "not guilty" verdict by itself provides all the
guidance necessary for future proceedings and punishment.
Part II addresses the major claim for the practical utility of the
justification/excuse distinction: sending clear moral messages in
cases of acquittal. Professors Robinson, Dressler and others argue
that acquittal based on justification implies that the conduct was
good or tolerable, while acquittal based on an excuse defense ap-
propriately suggests that the conduct was undesirable. This
argument is not correct.
An acquittal on any ground, including, for example, a reason-
able doubt that any crime was committed, carries no legal
implication of good behavior. One reason for the moral neutrality
of acquittals is the burden of proof, necessitated by the inability of
trials to determine absolute truth. Strong evidence of guilt of mur-
der falling just short of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
results in an acquittal, but does not imply that the defendant did
not in fact murder. This explains why no one in a bad marriage
17. Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DuKE L.J. 1, 6
(2003) ("To be sure, so long as scholars are going to employ it, it's important that they
should get the distinction right. But whether they should employ it at all is a separate ques-
tion, one about which I am frankly skeptical."); Id. at 77 ("I hope to prod scholars to argue
for their favored articulations of particular defenses (like particular offenses) in terms of
good policy broadly conceived-justice, fairness, efficiency, administrability and the like-
not in terms of conceptual or logical truths.").
18. Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 49 lAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 89 (1986) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Distinguishing]; Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing
Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1897 (1984) [hereinafter Greenawalt,
Perplexing Borders].
Unjustified
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with Robert Blake or O.J. Simpson would sleep easily. Similarly,
strong disproof of a self-defense defense to murder falling just
short of the prosecution's required burden results in acquittal
based on justification, but does not mean that the defendant in
fact acted in self-defense.' ' Under our system, a conviction assigns
moral and legal guilt, but an acquittal does not necessarily indicate
moral or legal innocence.
Criminal trials could be restructured to provide moral messages,
but this would be no small project. Presumably, there is no point in
generating more specific, but inaccurate moral messages. Accurate
messages would require changing defenses and procedures so that
in addition to determining legal guilt, they generated morally
meaningful findings. Apparently no proponent of creating morally
meaningful verdicts has explained the specifics of how the criminal
justice system would be refrained to accomplish this end.20 The
constitutional, financial, practical and technical problems with this
project are daunting, and are probably sufficient to explain why it
has apparently never been attempted.
Part III addresses the claim that the justification/excuse distinc-
tion helps allocate aider and abettor liability under existing law.
The argument is that one helping a merely excused principal, say,
an insane killer, should not have a defense, but helping a justified
principal, one acting in self-defense, for example, should not be
punished. However, modern codes, appropriately, impose liability
based on the defendant's conduct and mental state. Thus, the real
question is what the defendant thought they were doing. If a de-
fendant intended to aid a felonious killer but in fact aided a lawful
actor, they should at least be liable for attempt; by the same token,
a defendant who reasonably believed she aided lawful conduct
should not be condemned because the principal unexpectedly
turned out to be a criminal. On the modern view, whether the
principal was justified, excused or engaged in no criminal activity is
less important than is the evaluation of the defendant's personal
culpability.
Part IV responds to the argument that classes of defenses should
be treated similarly. For example, Professor Dressler suggests all
excuses should have similar, higher requirements because they
represent bad conduct that the state should not encourage. Alter-
19. Jurors Clear Millionaire In Murder Trial, KPRC HOUSTON, Nov. 12, 2003, http://
www.click2houston.com/news/2628046/detail.html (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform); Rob Margetta, Logic, Not Emotion, Drove Chieppa Verdict, Jury Says,
THE STANDARD-TIMES (Mass.), Mar. 29, 2007, available at http://wv.%,w.southcoasttoday.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070329/NEWS/703290367/10 1/TOWNI0.
20. The most elaborate attempt I am aware of is described infra note 77.
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natively, as Professor Fletcher suggests, perhaps all justifications
should have similar, higher requirements because the defendant is
claiming a benefit premised on a claim of good conduct. The
widely acknowledged possibility that justification defenses can be
satisfied with excuse conduct, and vice versa, make this sort of
categorical treatment unwise. Moreover, defenses in the same
group differ so widely that there is no compelling reason to treat
them identically without regard to their individual characteristics
and elements.
I. THE CORE PROBLEM: DOES NON-PUNISHMENT REQUIRE
JUSTIFICATION As DOES PUNISHMENT?
Because punishment requires justification, criminal liability
must be warranted on some set of moral and perhaps political
22
grounds. A person cannot be punished without a convincing ra-
tionale to punish. The opposite is not the case; it is not true that a
person can avoid punishment only if there is a convincing ration-
ale not to punish.2  Accordingly, analytical justification of
21. E.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258 (2008); Paul
Butler, Retribution, For Liberals, 46 UClA L. REv. 1873, 1876 (1999) ("A basic moral obliga-
tion is to do no harm. Punishment, therefore, requires justification."); Russell L.
Christopher, Time and Punishment, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 269, 272 (2005) ("[l]nflicting punish-
ment requires justification .... (citing R.A. Dur, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 1 (1986) ("It
is agreed that a system of criminal punishment stands in need of some strenuous and per-
suasive justification .... "))); Markus D. Dubber, Legitimating Penal Law, 28 CARDOZO I.. REV.
2597, 2597 (2007) ("As a form of state action, punishment requires a political, not merely a
moral, justification."); Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributiv-
ism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2192 (2001)
("Punishment requires justification because its potential modes of corporeal violence, in-
stilts to one's dignity or reputation, and restrictions on an individual's liberty are all
otherwise illegitimate social practices in the context of a well-ordered society."); Richard
Wasserstrom, Why Punish the Guilty?, 20 PRINCETON UNIV. MAG. 14 (1964) ("[Punishment's]
infliction demands justification."), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISH-
MENT 328, 337 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972).
22. Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 802 (1997) ("Some moral philosophers writing more
recently have insisted persuasively that the imposition of punishment by the state is indeed
distinctive and requires justification not only in moral, but also in political, theory." (citing
NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES 13-14
(1988); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 221 (1973);
Michael Philips, The Justification of Punishment and the Justificatin of Political Authority, 5 LAW
& PHIL. 393, 394 (1986))).
23. That is, a "not guilty" verdict does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant did not commit at least one element of the crime. Non-liability without a
convincing rationale for punishment pertains even if an individual has done something
wrong or undesirable, such as having forgotten a loved one's birthday, inflicted a gratuitous
insult, failed to show up for work without notice or good reason, or caused injury, albeit in
the exercise of due care.
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punishment is logically prior to, or simultaneous with, defense; it
makes little sense to explore the precise contours of defenses until
there are identified circumstances where people can be legiti-
mately punished.
Logically and by their terms, the definitions of justification and
excuse presuppose an existing theory of criminal liability and pun-
ishment from which the conditions warranting criminal
condemnation have been developed. Everything not condemned
by those reasons is not criminal and not punishable, not primarily
because it is a justification, excuse or something else (although it
may be describable as such), but primarily (or at least sufficiently)
because it does not warrant punishment under the controlling set
of reasons.24
The circumstances permitting punishment define by negative
implication at least the general categories where punishment is not
permitted. Thus, the "lack of blameworthiness" associated with an
excuse defense is the absence of precisely the same "blameworthy
mental state" required by the theory of punishment as a predicate
for condemnation. The good or tolerable conduct exculpated by
justification defenses is the same good or tolerable conduct that
the theory of punishment has already determined should not be
punished. Thus, to the extent that a theory of punishment itself
dictates that extreme youth or reasonable response to an unlawful
assault precludes criminal conviction, the law does not need a dis-
tinct theory ofjustification and excuse that can be used to develop
particular defenses.
The elements of a defense are of course important. It may be
that the theory of punishment dictates every detail, including, for
example, whether a person assailed outside their home must (or
need not) retreat if possible before using deadly force, or that a
person who provokes an assault with insulting words is (or is not)
denied the right to use force in self-defense. Alternatively, it may be
that at a certain level of specificity, the force of the theory stops
dictating details, which can and must be supplied by courts or leg-
islatures, and thus that the elements of defenses can legitimately
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. If the former, defenses are
24. Leaving aside burden-of-proof issues, it is arbitrary whether the existence or non-
existence of a fact is made an element of an offense, or denominated a defense; the law
could provide, for example, that an element of a particular offense was that the defendant
was not a police officer, or that being a police officer was a defense that the state had to
disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing
and Culpability, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 1567 (1999) ("That the law has distributed the
criteria for nonculpable right actions between the prima facie case and the defenses is of no
moral concern .. "); Westen, supra note 1, at 299-301.
FALL 2009]
artifacts of the theory of punishment; if the latter, they are inde-
pendent of it. But the categories of justification and excuse do not
have moral logic of their own, of equal rank to the moral theory of
punishment, pushing against and sometimes changing outcomes
that otherwise would obtain based on the theory of punishment
alone.
The functional differences between categories of conviction and
categories of acquittal also explain why greater moral rigor and
theoretical consistency in categorization is required for the former
than the latter. Within human capacity, a criminal statute may not
include non-punishable conduct or it will allow unjust convictions
for innocent behavior. But it is insufficient that all of the conduct
that a particular criminal statute describes is punishable. Statutes
must also be sufficiently precise that crimes are differentiated. An
operationalized moral theory might lead to the conclusion that
there should be two kinds of criminal conversion of property, say,
non-forcible theft and robbery, and that robbery should be pun-
ished more severely than theft without force. In those
circumstances, it would lead to injustice if the statutes were drafted
in a way permitting conviction for one when the fact-finder found
the other. Without careful differentiation between crimes, offend-
ers might be over-punished or under-punished, and morally over-
condemned or under-condemned.
In any given case, much less categorical precision is required not
to punish than to punish. Non-conviction can be for any number
of legal, evidentiary, factual or policy reasons, some but not all of
which involve not having committed the offense, or recognition of
the existence of defenses. In spite of their diversity, all reasons
leading to a "not guilty" verdict, or, for that matter, any other situa-
tion in which a person is not convicted of a crime, share a limited
but fundamental similarity: they signify that operation of our best
moral theory, put into laws which are as good as we can make
them, subject to conditions believed to be justice-enhancing such
as legal procedures and burdens of proof, thus far, has not lead to
criminal condemnation.2'
The morally agnostic nature of acquittals is doctrinally explicit.
As Justice Brennan said, writing for himself and Justices Marshall,
White and Stevens, "[A]n acquittal can never represent a determi-
nation that the criminal defendant is innocent in any absolute
25. This argument presupposes that police and prosecutors make reasonable efforts to
ferret out crime, and are given reasonable resources with which to do so.
Unjustified
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sense. 26 For this reason, the Constitution permits use of evidence
of acquitted conduct to aggravate a sentence for a different
crime. 27 Less controversially, an acquitted individual may neverthe-
less face a civil suit, or negative personnel action.2 s Because
acquittal on any ground leaves open possible underlying circum-
stances ranging from actual innocence to factual guilt, no moral
message flows from the naked fact of a "not guilty" verdict, prop-
erly understood. 29  This includes dismissals or acquittals on
technical grounds. The message "this acquittal carries with it no
26. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 107 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1984) (explaining that a "not guilty" verdict
"does not show that [thejury was] not convinced of the defendant's guilt." (quoting Dunn v.
United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932))); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,
465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984) ("[A]n acquittal on criminal charges does not prove that the de-
fendant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.").
27. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997). This rule has been trenchantly criti-
cized. See, e.g., Barry L. Johnson, If at First You Don't Succeed-Abolishing the Use of Acquitted
Conduct in Guidelines Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. REv. 153 (1996).
28. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.01 (2) (1980) ("The fact that conduct is justifiable
under this Article does not abolish or impair any remedy for such conduct that is available
in any civil action."); FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL lAW, supra note 9, at 576-77 ("Justi-
fied conduct in violation of the definition is not wrongful, but neither is it perfectly legal, as
is conduct that falls outside the scope of the definition. This type of harmful conduct might,
for example, support tort liability for the harm done.").
29. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 180-81 n.7 (2006) ("While a not guilty find-
ing is sometimes equated with a finding of innocence, that conclusion is erroneous....
Rather, [a reversal of conviction] indicates simply that the prosecution has failed to meet its
burden of proof." (quoting People v. Smith, 708 N.E.2d 365, 371 (Ill. 1999))); People v.
Ewing, 458 N.W2d 880, 883 (Mich. 1990) ("While the meaning of a valid criminal convic-
tion is clear ... an acquittal does not necessarily mean that the defendant did not engage in
criminal conduct.... As one court explained, 'A verdict of acquittal demonstrates only a
lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it does not necessarily establish the defendant's
innocence .... The jury needed only a reasonable doubt to acquit or quite plausibly it may
have returned its favorable verdict because of lenity."' (quoting United States v. Isom, 886
F.2d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 1989))).
30. Just as a lost object is always found in the last place one looks, when it is certain
that a prosecution cannot succeed, resolution of other characteristics of the case is moot,
and therefore properly back-burnered in a system required to make decisions about public
safety, justice, and liberty. Therefore, Professor Robinson's contention that non-exculpatory
public policy defenses should be treated specially is doubtftl. He writes: "Nonexculpatory
defenses not only threaten but clearly hinder achievement of the purposes of criminal liabil-
ity. There can be little doubt that acquitting culpable persons who have admittedly caused
the harm or evil prohibited by the criminal law must undercut the aims of special and gen-
eral deterrence." I ROBINSON, supra note 10, § 32(e); see also ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 71.
However, those pleading non-exculpatory defenses are virtually never "admittedly" liable. As
the Supreme Court explained, "The plea of not guilty is unlike a special plea in a civil ac-
tion, which, admitting the case averred, seeks to establish substantive ground of defence
[sic] by a preponderance of evidence. It is not in confession and avoidance, for it is a plea
that controverts the existence of every fact essential to constitute the crime charged." Davis
v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 485 (1895). This principle applies when particular defenses
are pleaded. Mathews v United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988) (holding that it is not inconsistent
to plead both entrapment and innocence); State xv Whitney-Biggs, 936 P.2d 1047 (Or. Ct.
App. 1997) (defendant pleaded insanity, extreme emotional disturbance, and self-defense).
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moral implication" has the rare virtue of being true and complete
in every single case.
Because the legal function of a "not guilty" verdict is unitary, as a
jurisprudential matter, there is no practical need to categorize its
basis. For the criminal justice system's purposes, it does not matter
whether the verdict was based on the state's failure to prove neces-
sary facts that go to, say, jurisdiction, a mental element, a conduct
element, a result element, identity, the absence of a general de-
fense, the absence of a statutory defense, or the absence of a
constitutionally-imposed non-statutory defense, or whether the
failure of proof was based on credibility of prosecution witnesses,
state's witnesses, or the defendant, or, while accepting the testi-
mony of all witnesses, the quantity of proof. Once any fact essential
to conviction has not been proved, both acquittal and non-
punishment rest on firm jurisprudential grounds. A general finding
of "not guilty" dictates both the just disposition of the case and the
just level of criminal punishment. There may indeed be conse-
quences for acquittees, but not from the judgment nor from the
criminal justice system.31
II. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE
TO SEND CLEAR MORAL MESSAGES
Although everyone not convicted of an offense is in the same
position with respect to the criminal justice system, the law could
be structured to give more precise moral guidance about why an
individual was not condemned. Professor Dressler proposes that
defenses should be categorized 32 as justifications or excuses so that
the law can send accurate moral messages.
[J]ustification defenses reflect society's judgment that certain
conduct is tolerable or desirable while excuse defenses recog-
nize those circumstances in which society considers it morally
unjust to punish and stigmatize wrongdoers. When the law
31. Of course, there are moral implications to every individual's actual conduct,
criminal or not, charged or not, convicted or not.
32. It seems fairly clear that he is addressing the categorical level; that is, the provoca-
tion plea should be regarded as a justification or excuse without regard to the facts of a
particular case, but based on its general elements and nature. See, e.g.,Joshua Dressier, Provo-
cation: PartialJustification or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD. L. REV. 467, 467-68 (1988). At the same
time, he seems to argue that the general category is important so that it can be applied to
individual cases. Id. at 468 ("There is considerable moral difference between saying that an
intentional killing is warranted (partially or filly), and saying that it is entirely wrong but
that the actor is partially or wholly morally blameless for his wrongful conduct.")
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fails to focus on the justification-excuse distinction it risks
sending a false message.33
Professor Robinson agrees that "when an actor is acquitted under a
justification defense, the message to the public may be unclear,
especially since the verdict of 'not guilty' gives no hint that a justi-
fication defense is at work"; in excuse cases, "a simple 'not guilty'
verdict" cannot always "convey the proper message."4 The moral
message of "not guilty" verdicts based on particular defenses is said
to apply to individual cases. Thus, Professors Westen and Man-
giafico characterize a justification as "the state's declaring to an
offender, 'You did nothing that the criminal law in any way regards
as regrettable under the circumstances."'3"5 According to Professor
Dressler, a "defendant who raises a justification defense in a crimi-
nal prosecution says, in essence, 'I did nothing wrong for which I
should be punished."' 3 Professor Robinson asserts that "a finding
ofjustification is a finding that the act was justified.
3 7
Clearly, convictions function as these scholars suggest; crimes
are precisely identified in verdicts to send accurate moral and legal
messages. Many people have moral intuitions with regard to, say,
burglary, or shoplifting, and apply that intuition to any individual
convicted of those offenses. This is appropriate in that a valid con-
viction represents a finding that every element of a particular
offense has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It would be a
significant moral problem for someone guilty of one offense to be
treated by the legal system as though she had committed an of-
fense of greater or lesser severity or one with different elements.
38
33. Dressier, Justifications andExcuses, supra note 9, at 1169.
34. 1 ROBINSON, supra note 10, § 32(c)-(d). Professor Fontaine apparently agrees that
moral labeling is a critical reason for the distinction. Fontaine, supra note 5. Even Professor
Greenawalt agrees that "[t]he law's treatment of justification and excuse should generally
track moral understanding." Greenawalt, Distinguishing, supra note 18, at 108; see also, e.g.,
Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1, 54 n.270 (1994); Robert F. Schopp et
al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Ex-
cuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 45, 111-12 ("Although both justification and excuse exculpate,
conflating the two in a single defense can also have practical significance.... [I]t distorts
the expressive function of the criminal law because it becomes impossible to determine
whether a particular decision expresses approval of the defendant's use of force or merely
absolves her of responsibility.").
35. Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 3, at 866.
36. Dressier, Justifications and Excuses, supra note 9, at 1161. Actually, this more accu-
rately describes the meaning of a plea of "not guilty." See supra note 29. Pleading a specific
defense, such as self-defense, says, "In addition to the state being unable to prove my guilt,
there is another reason that I cannot be convicted."
37. Robinson, supra note 9, at 275.
38. See, e.g., Franklin v. State, No. CR-06-1870, 2008 WL 5517604 (Ala. Ct. App. Dec. 19,
2008) (where it was not clear which of two crimes jury convicted on, defendant could only
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However, non-convictions do not work the same way. Proponents
of the justification/excuse distinction seem to recognize that no
moral message should be drawn from general verdicts of "not
guilty"; the law "fails to focus" on the substantive meaning of ac-
quittals now, says Professor Dressier; acquittals "give no hint" of
their basis, says Professor Robinson. These observations correctly
reflect the legal doctrine that the fact that a person is not charged
or not convicted of a crime does not demonstrate that they are in-
nocent; the burden of proof requires acquittal in the face of strong
evidence of guilt, unless the evidence eliminates every reasonable
doubt. Thus, any false moral messages that might be drawn from
acquittals alone are error, because by structure and design, no
moral message flows from acquittals under existing law. The best
available argument for the justification/excuse distinction, then, is
that further classification is desirable not because existing verdicts
are misleading, but because general acquittals represent a missed
opportunity to offer moral guidance."5
Second, moving from individual cases to statutes-as to both
crimes and defenses, criminal codes are reasonably clear morally
without labels. Imposition of the justification/excuse label on top
of existing conditions for liability is unlikely to add moral clarity to
criminal codes, and risks moral confusion. Drawing a moral mes-
sage from the requirements of an individual defense is more likely
to produce an accurate evaluation of the moral consequences of a
particular defense than is placing the defense in a larger category,
like justification or excuse, and then trying to extract a moral mes-
sage from the aggregate grouping.
A. Moral Clarity in Individual Cases
Scholars have identified several practical roadblocks to the as-
signment of moral messages to individual verdicts. Mitchell
Berman suggests that the law cannot morally label individual
criminal outcomes because of the non-identity of moral principles
and criminal codes-some morally justified conduct is not crimi-
nally justified, and vice versa.4° Kent Greenawalt points out that the
be convicted and punished for the lesser); State v. McBride, 504 So. 2d 840 (La. 1987) (evi-
dence did not support greater offense; although evidence supported lesser offense, court
could not direct conviction of lesser when it was not clear that jury found every element of
that offense).
39. See ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 204.
40. Berman, supra note 17, at 11-17.
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general verdict conceals the basis for, and thus the moral implica-
tions of, particular verdicts.
41
They acknowledge that these problems are soluble if the goal is
sufficiently important. Assume that in a given jurisdiction, the
principles of punishment flowing from the best moral theory are
identical to the unanimous considered moral judgments of the
people and their elected representatives, resolving Professor Ber-
man's objection. Assume also that all defenses are categorized as
justifications, excuses or another appropriate category, and that
labeling is so important that the general verdict is abolished in fa-
vor of verdicts explaining the basis for acquittals, resolving
Professor Greenawalt's objection. 2 Even with special verdicts and
agreement on moral principle, it would be very difficult to draw
clear moral messages from jury verdicts and other decisions.
1. The Deliberate Ambiguity of Acquittals
The law is clear that not being charged or convicted is not
equivalent to being innocent.4 This moral neutrality offers signifi-
cant advantages to the criminal justice system. As Cass Sunstein 4
and John Rawls4 ' have written in connection with other legal deci-
sion makers, there are substantial benefits to systems that generate
agreement on outcome without requiring agreement on reasons,
such as the current jury system. This approach is consistent with
justice; surely, if all jurors vote "not guilty," the verdict is legitimate
even if six jurors thought no crime had occurred and six others
41. Greenawalt, Distinguishing, supra note 18, at 106; Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, su-
pra note 18, at 1901.
42. ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 189-239.
43. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. Thus, the humor in Bill Murray's
dialogue with the U.S. Army recruiter in the movie Stripes:
Recruiter: There's some questions I have to ask. They're a little personal. Have
you ever been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor? That's robbery, rape,
car theft, that sort of thing?
Murray: Convicted?
Recruiter: Yeah.
Murray: No. Never convicted.
Recruiter: That's good. Good.
Drew's Script-O-Rama, Stripes dialogue transcript, http://www.script-o-rama.com/movie
scripts/s/stipes-script-transcript-bill-murray.html (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
44. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1733 (1995).




believed an alibi defense-or if the vote represented any other mix
of valid grounds for acquittal ." The Court has recognized that
judges need not decide difficult questions if answering easy ones
will resolve the case, both to promote efficiency and because deci-
sion makers forced to explore moot questions may not answer
well 7.4 Stopping deliberations as soon as an answer is reached saves
the time of victims, judges, and prosecutors, and of jurors who are
not required to explore questions irrelevant to the outcome of the
case at bar. All of these actors can then turn to other matters, such
as, for example, undecided criminal cases where public safety, in-
dividual liberty, and justice remain at stake. Stopping once the
answer is determined avoids conflict and shortens service among
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jurors, thereby reducing incentives to avoid jury service. On the
other hand, if morally, factually, or legally determinative acquittals
are to be sought, they will have to be achieved through processes
reasonably calculated to answer those questions accurately. These
procedures are likely to be much more elaborate than the current
system of criminal trials. On this view, the traditional opacity of
"not guilty" verdicts is both functional and virtuous.
General verdicts of "not guilty" are, apparently, constitutionally
required,'4 and the trial of John Peter Zenger, among others, re-
flects that achievement of the general verdict was an iconic
moment in the struggle for liberty. Opponents of the general
46. Cf Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, supra note 18, at 1906. Perhaps it would be a mis-
trial if 12 jurors agreed that a defendant is not guilty, but disagreed as to their reasoning.
Alternatively, perhaps they would vote individually, but it is difficult to draw a precise moral
meaning from a verdict like "4 jurors-alibi, 4 jurors-self-defense, 4 jurors-complainant's tes-
tirnony credible, but left a reasonable doubt that a crime took place."
47. Cf Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 821 (2009) (discussing multi-factor quali-
fied immunity, suppression and ineffective assistance tests, and cases allowing courts to skip
to dispositive elements directly to simplify the decisional process). The Court also ques-
tioned the wisdom of forcing decision makers to decide moot points. Id. at 820 (overruling
doctrine that sometimes required a lower court, having found a dispositive fact, nevertheless
to find and report on another constitutional question, stating that "there is a risk that a
court may not devote as much care as it would in other circumstances to the decision of the
constitutional issue."); see also Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
48. Of course, nothing would stop jurors from continuing to informally deliberate af-
ter the verdict was received if they regarded that as the highest and best use of their time.
49. See Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981) (explaining that the jury has "unre-
viewable power ... to return a verdict of not guilty for impermissible reasons."); Rachel E.
Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sen-
tencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 48-60 (2003); Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a
General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SuP. CT. REv. 81, 131 ("[A]t some level, at least, nulli-
fication is implicit in the constitutional notion of trial by jury, because nothing else explains
... why [a criminal] has a right to insist on a general verdict .. " (footnotes omitted)). For
an argument against special verdicts in criminal cases, see United States v. Spock, 416 E2d 165,
181-82 (1st Cir. 1969). See generally Kate H. Nepveu, Note, Beyond "Guilty" or "Not Guilty".
Giving Special Verdicts in CiminalJury Trials, 21 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 263 (2003).
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verdict make the case for special verdicts, but they do not typically
explain why the benefits outweigh any potential virtues of the gen-
eral verdict. It is also unclear that special verdicts would work as
proponents imagine.
a. The Procedural Context: Prophylactically Broad Defenses
and Burdens of Proof
A foundational premise of the criminal justice system is that fact-
finders have an imperfect ability to find the actual truth. Innocent
people are convicted and the guilty are acquitted, based on a fail-
ure or inability to present to the jury what really happened outside
the courtroom, or to have them evaluate it accurately.5' Given, for
example, events that took place without witnesses or illness or
death of witnesses, incompetent or overburdened prosecutors and
defense attorneys, exclusionary rules of procedure and evidence,
and the phenomena of perjury and mistake, verdicts do not always
reflect underlying truth. In addition, different juries may disagree
on whether identical facts give rise to a defense. Sometimes jurors
will break their oaths.
Of course, the system can only do the best that it can do-that
there remains metaphysical doubt after a trial that is as fair as it
can be made does not ordinarily warrant withholding moral judg-
ment following conviction. However, the legal system has created
rules and mechanisms premised on the fact-finding limitations of
trials. Many theories of criminal punishment accept the moral
proposition that it is better that a guilty person be erroneously ac-
quitted than that an innocent person be erroneously convicted. 5"
These conditions limit the ability of the criminal justice system to
send clear moral messages from failures to convict, no matter how
heroic the effort.
i. Prophylactically Overbroad Defenses
Just as there are good reasons for crimes to be drafted pre-
cisely,52 there are good reasons for defenses not to be so tightly
50. See generally Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Re-
liably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317 (1997).
51. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173 (1997).
52. Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885
(2004). And, at least in some cases, they are interpreted narrowly. Note, The New Rule of
Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2420 (2006).
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drawn that they cover only the precise conduct they are designed
to immunize. This may be an aspect of what Professor Greenawalt
meant when he described the "necessary crudeness" of statute
law. 3 Imagine a state allowing deadly force to arrest robbers. 54 As-
sume a high school student stole a bag of chips, and a shopkeeper
blocked the door and attempted to grab the bag,) shouting "citi-
zen's arrest!" The teen attempted to push the shopkeeper aside to
escape, thereby committing a robbery. 6 The teen's wallet fell to the
floor, revealing his photo identification and address. As the shop-
lifter ran away, the storekeeper thrice yelled, "Stop or I'll shoot!",
but the shoplifter-turned-robber kept running. The storekeeper
arrested the robber by fatally shooting him in the back. The police
interviewed the storekeeper, who made statements further calling
her action's morality into question: the storekeeper had looked for
an opportunity to kill, and studied the laws to find a situation
where it would be legal. She would not have shot if she had seen
the teen at her church, or otherwise imagined him to be a good
person, but thought he was a filthy immigrant leeching off the tax
dollars of good people by living in a public housing project. The
storekeeper found the experience erotic, and planned to repeat it
as soon as legally possible.
While technically within the justification statute, this might well
be regarded as an undesirable and immoral use of deadly force.
Perhaps the law should not benefit people who are pleased when
situations arise where force can be used. Even if deadly force
should be used for serious armed robberies, perhaps it should not
for minor robberies, or where the circumstances suggest an arrest
will later be possible without deadly force. Perhaps bad motives
should preclude the defense. On any or all of these grounds, the
conduct can be condemned.
Yet, a legislature entirely sharing this moral outlook might con-
clude that the law should not be changed-just as the New York
legislature has not added requirements to its statute57-not because
such conduct is praiseworthy, or because it would be impossible to
express in words why it was culpable, but because narrowing a de-
fense to impose liability in more cases risks creating more injustice
53. Greenawalt, Distinguishing, supra note 18, at 107.
54. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 35.30(4) (McKinney 2009).
55. Id. § 35.25.
56. Id. §§ 160.00(1), 160.05.
57. Id. § 35.30(4), Historical and Statutory Notes.
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than is eliminated.5' Recapitulating the principle that it is better to
acquit the guilty than convict the innocent, prophylactic over-
breadth helps ensure legal protection to people who deserve it. It
performs an expressive function, reassuring the police and other
actors that they should use warranted force, which could prevent
death and injury to innocent people. Even if the legislative deter-
mination not to criminalize this conduct is considered (i.e., the
legislature declined to act after a previous incident of this type),
that the storekeeper avoided liability based on a defense catego-
rized as a 'justification" is neither evidence of legal defect nor any
help to the actor's moral reputation.
The category 'Justification" in the criminal justice system means
only that an individual has avoided liability based on a defense
whose animating principle is that those who have done nothing
wrong should not be punished. Even if the challenged conduct is
within the statute, it does not necessarily mean that the actor has
done nothing wrong, in the moral sense, in this particular case.
Therefore, to assign a label to acquittees on this basis (say, "not
guilty-justification") will be inaccurate to an unknowable degree in
an unidentifiable number of specific cases, and to that extent fails
to offer accurate moral messages.
ii. The Burden of Proof
The burden of proof for justification defenses stands in the way
of both moral judgments and the claim that acquittal means that
the defendant in fact did nothing the criminal law regards as
wrong. The burden of proof is calibrated to avoid convicting the
innocent at the cost of making it more difficult to convict the le-
gally and morally guilty. No burden of proof can simultaneously be
so stringent that it prevents all erroneous convictions (ensuring
that all persons convicted are blameworthy) and so lenient that it
prevents all erroneous acquittals (ensuring that all persons not
convicted are blameless). Wherever it is set, there will be both
some defendants who get the defense and do not deserve it, and
others who deserve the defense but do not get it.
In many jurisdictions, the state must disprove self-defense be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 59 A jurisdiction could reasonably
58. "No ... code can accurately prescribe the correct conduct in all situations; it can
only provide an approximation of society's intuitive judgments." Robinson, supra note 9, at
271; seealso ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 56.
59. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-205(A) (2006); Haw. Pattern Jury Instructions-Crim.,
Instruction 7.01 (1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 101(1) (1964 & Supp. 2005); N.M. UJI Crim.
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conclude that this high burden is warranted, to prevent the occa-
sional conviction of an innocent person. ° Take, for example,
North Dakota, which by statute deems mistaken justifications "ex-
cuses," 1 signaling that it regards the distinction as important. Even
in North Dakota, when there is clear and convincing evidence (but
not proof beyond a reasonable doubt) that the defendant is a cold-
blooded murderer who did not act in self-defense, the individual
must be acquitted as 'justified. 6 2
In this way, all justification defenses are in part non-exculpatory
public policy defenses. They sometimes exonerate the guilty be-
cause of substantive and procedural features intended to protect
the innocent.6 In no case, therefore, does a verdict of "not guilty,"
even one known through a special verdict or otherwise based on a
pure justification defense, necessarily represent moral or legal ex-
culpation. Thus, drawing a strong moral conclusion from any
acquittal without examining the facts is not logical. 4 Proposals to
draw moral messages from acquittals present the "disease as cure"
problem, changing agnostic "not guilty" verdicts that are accurate
in every case to potentially morally misleading ones by assigning
reasons that will sometimes be false.
41.40 (1982); N.Y. Penal L. § 25.00(1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-03(1) (1985); People v.
Saavedra, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 403, 410 (Ct. App. 2007); Geffkin v. State, 820 So. 2d 331, 335
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Carroll v. State, 744 N.E.2d 432, 433-34 (Ind. 2001); State v.
Spaulding, 296 N.W.2d 870, 875 (Minn. 1980); State v. Jenewicz, 940 A.2d 269, 275 n.4 (N.J.
2008); Commonwealth v. Torres, 766 A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. 2001); Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d
910, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). See generally Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Homicide: Modern
Status of Rules as to Burden and Quantum of Proof to Show Self-Defense, 43 A.L.R.3d 221 (1972 &
Supp. 2009).
60. Even in a state requiring the defendant to prove self-defense, the preponderance
of the evidence standard contemplates that in a thousand cases where the defense is success-
fully invoked, as many as 499 defendants might be acquitted though guilty.
61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-08 (1985).
62. State v. Falconer, 732 N.W.2d 703, 708 (N.D. 2007) ("A defendant is entitled to a
self-defense jury instruction if there is evidence to support it, and the State must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt the defendant did not act in self-defense.").
63. Cf Greenawalt, Distinguishing, supra note 18, at 106 ("Legal categorization must
usually be responsive to facts discoverable in the legal process. It cannot draw important
lines on the basis of differences that are unascertainable by observers.").
64. This assumes that the accuracy of the conclusion is important. But if it is not, then
there is no reason to modify the criminal justice system to generate unimportant moral
messages. See also infra Part lI.C (discussing the point that acquittals are likely to include
many near-convictions as well as some wrongful prosecutions of wholly innocent people).
That is, if babysitter candidates A and B were otherwise well qualified, and neither had ever
been charged with or convicted of a crime, except that Candidate A had been charged,
tried, and unanimously acquitted of First Degree Murder of an infant, most parents would
prefer Candidate B.
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2. The Non-Existence of Categorically Pure Defenses
Generating special verdicts that are meaningful as to justifica-
tion or excuse would require major changes to the criminal justice
system. Leaving aside defenses that prophylactically include culpa-
ble conduct, either substantively (through prophylactic
overbreadth) or procedurally (through burdens of proof), labels
assigned to existing defenses will be inherently ambiguous in indi-
vidual cases. Existing defenses are not sharp-edged enough, to use
Professor Greenawalt's phrase, to allow moral inferences even from
special verdicts identifying their basis. A realistic description of the
defense of, say, self-defense, is that the legislature put the defense
in the code because typically people who meet the elements do not
deserve punishment. The statute is drafted in such a way that in
most cases it protects those, and only those, whom the legislature
had in mind. When a person successfully invokes the statute, nor-
mally they are acquitted because they are not worthy of
punishment. But these things are not always true.
Most existing defenses can be satisfied by facts characterizable as
justification, and facts characterizable as excuse. Under the Model
Penal Code (MPC, 6- for example, all justifications can be satisfied
by excuse-type conduct. Most of the justification defenses are avail-
able based on an actor's "belief' that the elements exist, but the
defense is lost as to reckless or negligent crimes if the belief is reck-
less or negligent under MPC § 3.09(2). MPC negligence means
gross negligence; it is defined as "a gross deviation from the stan-
dard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation.""' Therefore, if a defendant police officer honestly but
with simple and not gross negligence believed deadly force was
necessary to make an arrest warranted under MPC § 3.07(2) (b),
the defendant could be convicted of no crime. The acquittal would
be on the basis of a defense bearing the label 'justification." How-
ever, should the situation arise again, society would not want the
officer to kill an innocent person based on a lack of due care. Ac-
cordingly, the facts are in the nature of excuse.
By the same token, whatever else it has proved, the debate over
the status of duress67 has produced agreement that it can be satis-
65. MODEL PENAL CODE (1982).
66. Id. § 2.02(2) (d); see also id. § 1.13(16) (defining "reasonable belief" as "a belief that
the actor is not reckless or negligent in holding.").
67. See Dressier, Justifications and Excuses, supra note 9, at 1170 n.57 ("Although neces-
sity is ajustification and duress is an excuse, one can easily posit circumstances in which the
elements of either defense could apply."); Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, supra note 18, at
1912; Huigens, supra note 3, at I (noting that Westen and Mangiafico "show that hypotheti-
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fled both by facts characterizable as justification, and facts charac-
terizable as excuse.68 Even "excuse" defenses like mistake of law69 or
involuntary intoxication 0 or insanity can sometimes be satisfied by
praiseworthy conduct that should be repeated if the circumstances
reoccur. Defenses like the statute of limitations or speedy trial have
elements of the public policy of repose independent of culpability,
but are also grounded on potential inability to evaluate both justi-
fication and excuse defenses. They leave open possible underlying
facts ranging from guilt on all charges to actual innocence.
Sending clear moral messages requires morally differentiated
special verdicts.7 This could be achieved by one of two approaches:
by restructuring all defenses so that they represent pure cases of
justification or excuse, 2 or by creating a new moral verdict, not
tied to any particular defense, but inquiring directly whether the
defendant's conduct was justified or excused.73
cal cases that are identifiable as duress on relatively uncontroversial criteria are analyzable as
cases ofjustified action.").
68. See also FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 9, at 833-34 (noting,
with apparent endorsement, that the German code combines duress and necessity into a
single defense).
69. Professor Fletcher calls this an excuse. Fletcher, Rights and Excuses, supra note 9, at
19; see also ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 228. But imagine, for example, that in an emergency
the mayor orders officers of a city police department to travel to another jurisdiction within
the state. The officers doubt that they have authority to exercise police powers in that juris-
diction under state law, so the mayor obtains an injunction, affirmed by the court of appeals,
holding that they have police powers in the other jurisdiction and must obey the order to
travel. An officer, relying on the injunction, makes a probable cause arrest of a murderer
under conditions that for a non-peace officer would constitute kidnapping. The next day,
the state supreme court in another case holds that officers out of their jurisdiction, under
the circumstances, had only the authority of a private citizen, and that the court of appeals
decision is erroneous. This conduct, reasonable compliance with an apparently valid court
order, is desirable and should be done again should similar circumstances arise. Although a
mistake, it fits neatly into the definition ofjustification.
70. Imagine a kidnapper who drugs his victim, a DEA Agent. The victim, involuntarily
intoxicated, kills the kidnapper, believing him to be Mussolini before the declaration of war
with the United States. There is no justification defense, because the foundational motiva-
tion did not exist. Yet some might reasonably conclude that the killer is morally
praiseworthy.
71. It could be argued that the imprecise moral messages that would be derived from
special verdicts based on existing defenses would be good enough. However, for that argu-
ment to prevail, it would be necessary to explain why the existing imprecise moral messages
that can now be derived from general verdicts, pleaded defenses and the trial record are
not.
72. Ideally, scholars and other participants in the criminal justice system would reach
substantial consensus on the classification of particular defenses and sub-defenses asjustifi-
cation or excuse; if they did not, the risk of erroneous moral messages would remain.
73. This approach is consistent with the work of Dean Heidi Hurd. See Hurd, supra note
24. Dean Hurd proposes that all action be categorized as culpable or non-culpable, and right
or wrong, yielding the possibilities of actions that are: 1) culpable and right, 2) culpable and
wrong, 3) non-culpable and right, 4) non-culpable and wrong. Id. at 1560. "We would thus do
better to abandon the legal use of the terms justification' and 'excuse' altogether in favor of
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Creating categorically pure defenses would be problematic. For
example, instead of "not guilty" the verdict would be "not guilty-self-
defense." But the substance of self-defense can be satisfied by either
justification or excuse conduct,14 and the government typically bears
the burden of disproving it. Accordingly, the self-defense special
verdict would have to be subdivided into, say, the justification de-
fense of "not guilty-self-defense (actual)," and excuse defenses that
might be something along the lines of "not guilty-self-defense (sim-
ple negligence)," and "not guilty-self-defense (objectively reasonable
but in fact unnecessary)." Each verdict would have to be further
subdivided to account for the burden of proof-for the verdict to be
morally meaningful, the jury must explain whether it is reporting
what actually happened, or, instead, it only means that the govern-
ment failed to disprove some possibility under the governing
standard. Of course, there would have to be similar special verdicts
for each defense submitted to the jury, because there might be po-
tentially differing moral messages among them.
Even such a special verdict would provide limited information if
the jury's determination is restricted to the defenses on the books.
The only way to obtain an ultimate moral judgment is to ask the
moral question directly: Was the conduct 'justified" under a general
definition of justification, even if it did not satisfy the terms of any
defense?7 5 If limited to defenses on the books, then the verdict's
moral meaning will remain merely a "necessarily crude" legal judg-
ment. If not so limited, the time, expense, and scope of relevant
evidence might be expanded substantially.
There is also the question of whether trials would be bifurcated,
first determining guilt, and turning to trial of the moral basis of the
verdict only in cases of acquittal. Bifurcation could allow exploration
of moral questions without morally precise defenses, and avoid in-
troduction of moral evidence in cases of conviction. However,
talking about actions in [these] four ways ...." Id. at 1561. It is not clear that she proposes
using these moral categories to restructure defenses, but her idea could be pressed into the
service of that end. Similarly, Professor Robinson has noted, without proposing, that "[a]
change in procedural rules to permit a culpability determination after the grant of a nonex-
culpatory defense" would make it possible to determine moral culpability. 1 ROBINSON, supra
note 10, § 38(c). Of course, if there is value to exploring the true conduct of defendants
who win dispositive motions or verdicts, the same value exists for those never charged be-
cause of the same legal impediments to conviction.
74. Paul H. Robinson, Objective Versus Subjective Justification: A Case Study in Function and
Form in Constructing a System of Criminal Law Theory (Univ of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-23, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=1141982 (arguing that mistaken justifications should be regarded as excuses).
75. This could be done within the rule of law by enacting general definitions ofjustifi-




bifurcation raises even thornier practical questions. Would moral
trials be required in every case, or only upon request of a party or
victim? Would moral trials be required as part of plea bargains dis-
missing or reducing charges? Would moral trials be required even if
the defendant's behavior were to be explored in a civil forum, such
as in a wrongful death or civil commitment action? Would prosecu-
tors, defendants and victims be required to participate even if they
did not want to? Would defendants be entitled to free counsel if in-
digent? If not indigent, would defendants be required to pay for
attorneys?
If unitary trials were used, would every criminal trial require ad-
mission in the case-in-chief of evidence relevant only to moral issues
(because it will be difficult to know in advance which cases will result
in acquittal)? In either unitary or bifurcated trials, would juries be
required to decide guilt even if that question was difficult, and they
could quickly conclude that one or more defenses were satisfied?
Would moral verdicts be entered as judgments and given collateral
estoppel or res judicata effect against a defendant or the state, or
would they be for moral purposes only? Either way, could an acquit-
ted defendant or prosecutor aggrieved by a moral verdict appeal if
the outcome was correct but the reason was wrong?
However these questions are resolved, the project of drawing
moral conclusions from acquittals is not a matter of putting general
labels on duress, provocation, and other defenses and identifying
the basis of decision with a simple and convenient special verdict.
Rather, it would require potentially major restructuring of the
criminal justice system. Unless proponents claim and show that
moral verdicts are an indispensable characteristic of a legitimate
criminal justice system, the benefits of categorization and informa-
tion generation must compete with other goals of a system already
claiming to be overburdened and underfunded: 6 cost, administra-
bility, and effect on the accuracy of verdicts on liability. The
imposition on juries, expanding their duties from deciding cases to
generating moral information, would also have to be weighed.
Conceivably, moral trials are both possible and worthwhile; but to
my knowledge no advocate of precise categorization has set out a
concrete proposal offering chapter and verse about the structure of
76. Thus, additional trials are difficult to obtain, even for convicted persons with plau-
sible claims of innocence. Charles I. Lugosi, Executing The Factually Innocent: The US.
Constitution, Habeas Copus, and the Death Penalty: Facing the Embarrassing Question at Last, 1
STAN. J. Civ. RTS. & Civ. LIBERTIES 473 (2005). It is difficult to argue that potentially assign-
ing moral judgment to a person who may be guilty but will not be punished is more
important to justice and to the public perception of justice than is potentially relieving
moral and legal judgment from someone who might be innocent but is being punished.
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such trials." Therefore, at the moment, there is not even a claim
that moral verdicts might be a practical addition to the criminal jus-
tice system. Operationally, no American jurisdiction has concluded
that the rewards of morally precise special verdicts outweigh their
costs and disadvantages. With neither a realistic proposal, nor any
evidence of legislative movement, the project of distinguishing justi-
fication and excuse cannot be regarded as practically important to
the criminal justice system because of its potential to facilitate mor-
ally precise verdicts.
B. Moral Clarity in Codes
If it would be difficult to use the justification/excuse distinction
to assign moral messages to individual dispositions, perhaps the dis-
tinction would be useful in codes. Unquestionably, the law sends
valuable moral messages at the categorical, statutory level. However,
the law succeeds here without the necessity of labeling.
Codes identify crimes and specify punishments that are designed
to be greater for crimes regarded as more serious. Many states clas-
sify crimes by levels, with ascending penalties based on ascending
degrees of seriousness."' Statutory criminalization sends a clear
moral message that certain conduct is undesirable-crimes are bad,
those who commit them are criminals. Different classifications and
sentences show that some are more blameworthy than others. In
New York for example, forgery in the first degree79 is a Class C
felony, a serious crime punishable by up to fifteen years imprison-
77. The closest that I am aware of is in Paul Robinson's book, Structure and Function in
Criminal Law. ROBINSON, supra note 13. Although he observes that "[a] code of adjudication
is most useful if it includes all rules relevant to the liability decision," id. at 198, apparently
no provision of the draft code addresses the presumption of innocence or the burden of
proof for either crimes or defenses. Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1)-(3) (1980) (imposing
a burden of proof standard and explaining its parameters). Accordingly, it is simply not
clear how these considerations would interact with special verdicts. And although he pro-
poses a number of special verdicts, ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 204-07, 238-39, he does not
discuss procedural implementation, such as jury instructions, the preclusive effects of the
special verdicts, or the availability of appeals. Therefore, for all of the interesting ideas in the
book, it does not constitute a testable proposal.
78. E.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-601 (2001) (creating six numbered classes of felo-
nies, three numbered classes of misdemeanors, and unclassified petty offenses); N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 55.05 (McKinney 2009) (creating five classes of felonies and three categories of mis-
demeanors).
79. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 170.15 (McKinney 2009).
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ment.8 0 Robbery in the first degree 81 is also a felony, but it is a Class B
felony, punishable by up to twenty-five years.82
Defenses also reflect their moral characteristics in their re-
quirements. For example, New York's self-defense statute provides
that "[a] person may ... use physical force upon another person
when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be
necessary to defend himself, herself or a third person from what he
or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlaw-
ful physical force. ' 3 The insanity defense provides that it is a
defense if the defendant "lacked criminal responsibility by reason
of mental disease or defect" that prevented him from understand-
ing "[t]he nature and consequences of such conduct" or "[t]hat
such conduct was wrong.,84
The elements, the substance of the statutes, send moral mes-
sages. Even though they do not explicitly declare it, the New York
statutes send an unmistakable moral message that while forgery is
bad, armed robbery is worse. The self-defense statute informs the
"reasonable" person that they "may use" force to prevent an
"unlawful" event-affirmative permission for a person with a good
characteristic (reasonableness) to prevent a bad thing. The insanity
defense relieves from "responsibility" those who have a "mental
disease or defect" that prevents them from understanding what is
going on around them. There is no hint that the conduct is
praiseworthy or permitted; the statute merely provides that respon-
sibility is relieved from some of those who are severely diseased or
defective.
Regardless of the precise drafting of defenses, virtually any code
providing exceptions to criminal responsibility under certain de-
fined circumstances will have the quality of moral clarity, because
the reader can tell whether the elements of the defense represent
good or bad conduct. Some defenses are partial or incomplete,
mitigating a crime to a lesser degree but leaving the defendant
convicted. It is difficult to miss the moral message in these cases-
the person who successfully invokes one of these doctrines remains
a criminal.
It is doubtful that additional labels are useful here. First, the ar-
gument that justification and excuse are important labels because
they are needed to send clear moral messages exists side-by-side
with arguments that: 1) it is not always clear whether particular
80. Id. § 70.00(2).
81. Id. § 160.15.
82. Id. § 70.00(2).
83. Id. § 35.15(1).
84. Id. § 40.15.
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defenses are justifications or excuses, and 2) sometimes justifica-
tion defenses can be satisfied with excuse facts, and vice versa.
Fortunately, there is an option for sending moral messages other
than categorizing the basis of acquittal as justification or excuse:
namely, identifying the defense. Instead of saying, for example,
that a statute "excused" a defendant from liability, the law could
provide that "duress" is a defense to liability under particular cir-
cumstances. Whatever moral message flows from the elements of
duress would flow without the intermediate step of classifying it as
a justification or excuse. If sending a message by using a broad
category like justification or excuse is useful, sending it by using
the actual basis of decision is even better, just as calling a convic-
tion "First Degree Assault" or "Aggravated Kidnapping" under a
particular statute is more informative than calling it a "felony" or a
"crime."
Conceivably, the law could add the justification/excuse classifi-
cation to the information mix. For example, it could encourage
legislators to identify all defenses as justifications or excuses, thus
offering evaluators both the label and the elements. But the label
adds nothing where the categorization is obvious. To claim that it is
morally useful to label the defense of insanity as an excuse is to
claim that people might otherwise miss the moral message that it is
undesirable to kill innocent people because of a mental disease or
defect that prevents the defendant from understanding the nature
85or quality of her actions. Those whose moral intuition does not
lead to that conclusion without a label are unlikely to find a label
persuasive.
On the other hand, when the categorization of a particular de-
fense is debatable, the practice risks inaccurately classifying an
offense. Examination of the elements of the defense, perhaps in
conjunction with an examination of the facts, offers a direct basis
from which to draw a moral conclusion. In sum, we care about
moral clarity at the statutory level. That goal has been substantially
achieved, through careful definition of defenses, but without nec-
essarily using labels or precise classifications to ascribe moral
meaning to those defenses.
85. The independence of the moral message from the label might be tested by imagin-
ing the effect of a statutory absolntion-"It is the policy of this state that a defendant
acquitted of homicide who was unable to understand the nature of their actions because of
mental disease or defect shall feel no guilt nor be regarded by any person in this state as
having done anything wrong." This law would almost certainly be ineffective, because the
moral judgment of the defendant's conduct will flow from the evaluation of the conduct,
not from the assigned label.
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Professor Westen offers a more limited proposal. Agreeing that
the distinction should not be put to juries, he believes that legisla-
tors should consider the general principles of justification and
excuse when they make law. When drafting or revising, they should
ask themselves:
What is the basis for this defense? Is it that actors who invoke
the defense have produced no harm or risk that the state re-
gards as regrettable ... ? Or is it that, [even if they] engaged
in conduct the state regards as regrettable or undesirable...
they lacked certain additional features that must obtain for
persons to be blameworthy for such conduct?6
On the one hand, these points are important, and have the virtue
of containing in a few short sentences everything policymakers
need to know about the debate about justification and excuse.
With respect to defenses and all other civil and criminal regula-
tion, policymakers should consider what conduct to encourage
(while considering potential unintended consequences), and what
conduct, though undesirable for moral and practical reasons,
should not be regulated with particular tools. Yet, the very general-
ity of the observation raises the question: Do these questions
address an actual problem? Are there really criminal codes struc-
tured without awareness that good conduct should be encouraged
and bad conduct discouraged (but not always punished)? One
might assume that legislators as a group always take these things
into account.
One piece of evidence of legislative thinking comes from recent
statutes providing civil immunity for use of force for which the ac-
tor is not criminally liable. If legislatures immunize undesirable
conduct (e.g., killings by the involuntarily intoxicated or by in-
fants), but not good conduct (killings in lawful self-defense), or
both bad and good conduct without distinction, that would suggest
legislatures need much more guidance. On the other hand, if the
statutes immunize only good conduct, that would suggest drafters
grasp the point without need for additional elaboration of con-
cepts ofjustification and excuse. An admittedly quick look suggests
that legislatures do distinguish between good and bad conduct,
86. Westen, supra note 1, at 314; see also George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable,
98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 955 (1985) (stating that "[t]he distinction between justification and
excuse is of fundamental theoretical and practical value" and citing the framing of a crimi-
nal code as a practical application).
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and have drafted with the difference in mind. If encouraging leg-
islators to distinguish between good and bad conduct is a main
goal of the effort to define justification and excuse, it has been
achieved through other means, without a definitive definition of
justification and excuse and their differences, or assignment of all
defenses to one category or the other.
C. Alternative Opportunities for Moral Education
Many proponents of the justification/excuse distinction contend
that sending messages from non-convictions would be a valuable
function of the criminal justice system.88 If moral messages from
87. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(e) (2005); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704.5
(2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (2007); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 184009 (2004); KAN. STAr. ANN. § 21-3219 (2007); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 503.085 (LexisNexis 2008); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 780.972 (West 2007); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:62A-20 (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25(B) (West 2002); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-450 (2003 & Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-621 (2006); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32 (Vernon 2003).
88. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 118-19. My intuition is that the public is not
interested in this distinction. Cf 1 ROBINSON, supra note 10, § 32(e) ("Yet, at present, few
seem to be aware that such nonexculpatory defenses exist and fewer still seem to be aware of
which defenses are of this sort."). The recipients of the moral messages with which propo-
nents are concerned may be the public at large. Professor Dressler cites the example of
protestors who won a civil disobedience claim on an excuse rather than justification theory.
"As a result, their moral message was... lost." Dressier, Justifications and Excuses, supra note 9,
at 1171. Before concluding that the public consciously regards the justification/excuse dis-
tinction as important in their moral universe, some evidence to that effect would be helpful.
As a rough and ready test, I searched the enormous "USNP" database on Westlaw for the
following: "("heat of passion" provocation duress) /p justification /p excuse." I found two
arguably responsive articles. The first was a story about the oral argument in Dixon v. United
States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006), which held in an opinion in which the justification/excuse did not
loom large that the burden of proof for duress could constitutionally be placed on the de-
fendant. See Gina Holland, Court Takes up Battered-Woman Defense, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 26,
2006, at A5. The critical language in the story was that at the oral argument the prosecution
"repeatedly referred to the duress claim as an 'excuse.'Justice John Paul Stevens, sounding
irritated, said that the word justification' might also apply." Id. The other article was Margot
Slade, Justice is Stretched to Allow Wider Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1988, at B5, which
reported:
Graham Hughes, a law professor at New York University, said courts were moving "to-
ward a more expansive view of legitimate excuses and defenses." He suggested,
however, that the groundwork was laid in 1952, when the duress provision of the
model penal code was amended. Like the self-defense justification, it originally re-
quired a coercive threat be imminent. The definition was expanded to include
threats that were unmistakable even if not immediate.
Id. If the public does not pay attention to the distinction, then any fizziness in the distinc-
tion will not be a problem with respect to them. (By the same token, if the general public is
to benefit from the moral message, it is not enough for the law to make the distinction. In
addition, some mechanism has to be found to educate them about it.)
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non-convictions are valuable, s9 then the question is: What is the
best way to generate those moral messages? It is far from obvious
that the best approach is through "not guilty" verdicts in criminal
trials.
Most trials receive no attention whatsoever, other than from law-
yers, judges, jurors, defendants, and court staff. The system
probably need not and should not be reformed primarily to pro-
vide more information to this group.
More valuable lessons might be derived from more comprehen-
sive examination of the facts and legal arguments of the smaller
number of trials that are the subject of media attention. Individuals
could then draw their own moral conclusions." Yet it is unrealistic
to expect citizens to regularly read trial transcripts, pleadings, and
trial orders so they can draw accurate legal messages from acquit-
tals. If citizens now have insufficient guidance about legal behavior,
it might well be more fruitful to suggest they read statutes and ap-
pellate cases, rather than try to derive meaning from individual
verdicts.
Those who think sending moral lessons is an important function
of individual cases could also consider an entirely different pool.
One problem with assigning moral meanings to acquittal is that
the clearest cases of innocence are disproportionately screened out
before trial. Imagine a storekeeper who kills a man whom the
storekeeper claims was a robber. The storekeeper's customers cor-
roborate the explanation. The police might accept the story and
make no arrest. If there is an arrest, the prosecutor might decline
prosecution if the defense is clear-cut, or even if the defense is
weak but the prosecutor believes it is in fact true (or that the de-
fense is false, but the evidence for it is strong). If the prosecutor
initiates a prosecution, the judge at a preliminary hearing or a
grand jury might decline to charge.
Those charged in spite of claimed defenses are typically charged
because one or more decision makers, rightly or wrongly, doubt
the defense. Accordingly, compared to all persons, or to all persons
investigated but not tried, those acquitted after trial are dispropor-
tionately those for whom the evidence of guilt was relatively strong,
89. A debatable point given that unappealable acquittals by unaccountable juries
might be contrary to law, and are non-precedenfial, and therefore of little help to diligent
citizens who study and rely on them.
90. In the handful of criminal cases generating media attention-O.J. Simpson, Mar-
tha Stewart, John DeLorean, Phil Spector, R. Kelly, Oliver North, Robert Blake, John
Hinkley, Michael Jackson, Scooter Libby, the assailants of Vincent Chin and Rodney King-
the major apparent lesson is that the verdict is not an authoritative moral message unless the
jury's evaluation of the facts coincides with that of public or media evaluators, suggesting
that further refinement is likely to be received with equal indifference.
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and the evidence for any defense relatively weak. This is one prac-
tical reason that even successful justification defenses are not
particularly probative of good behavior: many of them may be
near-convictions rather than wrongful prosecutions of innocents.
Therefore, subdivision of this group of acquittees is less likely to be
accurate and meaningful than would be assignment of labels to
members of other, more differentiated, pools. If formal exonera-
tions are to be part of the law, it would seem reasonable to
consider starting with individuals who prosecutors or grand juries
never charged because of a conscious belief in actual innocence to
see what actually resulted. The moral messages are more likely to
be meaningful and accurate in this context.
III. LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTIES
Professors Dressler and Robinson propose that the distinction
between justification and excuse is important, apparently as a mat-
ter of current legal doctrine, for determination of the liability of
aiders and abettors of a principal who has a defense.9 As Professor
Dressler puts it:
If A provides D with a gun in order to kill V, and D is acquit-
ted on the ground of self-defense, it follows that A should also
be acquitted of the offense since she has aided the primary
party to commit a socially acceptable act. If D is acquitted on
the ground of an excuse-let us assume, insanity-no reason
of logic or policy requires the acquittal of A, assuming that
she is not also insane or otherwise excused.
92
Several scholars have argued that this approach is jurispruden-
tially unsound.3  The principle also seems an incomplete
description of current criminal law doctrine. As a specific applica-
tion of a broader rule that "[i]f the acts of the principal ... are
91. Robinson, supra note 9, at 279 ("Ifan act is justified, the conduct of anyone assist-
ing in the act should also be justified. But if an actor is excused, the excuse should
appropriately be limited to him and should not extend to others.").
92. Dressler, Justications and Excuses, supra note 9, at 1173.
93. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 17, at 62-64; Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, supra note
18, at 1919 ("How the law should handle the intervention of others is too complicated a
matter to be determined by initial characterization of a defense as a justification or ex-
cuse ... ."); Douglas N. Husak, Justifications and the Criminal Liability of Accessories, 80 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491 (1989); Westen, supra note 1, at 312 ("[T]he presence ofjustification
does not determine whether third parties may assist an actor, nor does the presence of ex-
cuse determine whether third parties and an actor's victim may resist him.").
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found not to be criminal, then the accomplice may not be con-
victed,"94 some modern cases conclude that if a principal was
justified, rather than avoiding liability on excuse or some other ba-
sis, then there can be no aider and abettor liability.95 On their facts,
these results may be correct, but because the justification of the
primary actor does not mean that no others have committed a
crime,6 the rule is misleading. Another approach, that the defen-
dant's criminal liability should be determined primarily by
examination of his mental state and conduct, identifies the scope
of liability in a wider array of cases.97
Defendants who believe they are assisting felonious killers are li-
able at least for attempt, even if the principal is in fact justified."'
94. 2 WAYNE R. IAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoT-r, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.8(c), at
160 (1986). The Model Penal Code addresses this issue in one context at section 3.11(1),
defining "unlawful force" as force "the employment of which constitutes an offense or ac-
tionable tort or would constitute such offense or tort except for a defense (such as the
absence of intent, negligence or mental capacity; duress; youth; or diplomatic status) not
amounting to a privilege to use the force." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(1) (1980).
95. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 662 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1987); State v. Montanez,
894 A.2d 928 (Conn. 2006); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 521 S.E.2d 293 (Va. Ct. App. 1999)
(en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 537 S.E.2d 592 (Va. 2000). The issue is not whether the
principal was acquitted in some other proceeding. The Supreme Court has rejected the
application of non-mutual collateral estoppel in criminal cases, so a third party's acquittal
has no constitutional implications for another defendant's case. Standefer v. United States,
447 U.S. 10 (1980). Further, modern codes allow conviction of accomplices following acquit-
tal of other participants. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(7) (1980). However, if the
defendant's status as an aider and abettor depends on some other person's liability, that
liability must be proved in the defendant's trial before the defendant can be convicted. E.g.,
Montanez, 894 A.2d at 945 (defendant entitled to jury instruction on liability of principal);
State v. Peel, 111 So. 2d 728, 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (althotgh Holzapfel, the alleged
principal, had been acquitted, Peel, the alleged aider and abettor, could be tried, but "the
state would have the burden of proving Holzapfel guilty as the principal in the first degree
before Peel could be found guilty as a principal in the second degree of aiding and abet-
ting.").
96. For example, in some jurisdictions the justified killing of a felon by a victim or a
police officer may leave co-felons guilty of felony murder. People v. Klebanowski, 852 N.E.2d
813 (Il. 2006); State v. Oimen, 516 N.W.2d 399 (Wis. 1994).
97. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 222 S.W.3d 171, 181 (Ark. 2006) ("[T]he finder of fact
must make a determination of the mental state of the person accused tinder accomplice
liability."); Tharp v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Ky. 2000) ("The principal actor's
mental state with respect to his own conduct, or the degree of his criminal liability, is largely
immaterial to the criminal liability of an accomplice or the degree thereof."); People v. Bar-
tow, 800 N.Y.S.2d 200, 202 (App. Div. 2005) ("The defendant was charged as an accomplice,
and when two persons are criminally liable for an offense which is divided into degrees,
'each person is guilty of such degree as is compatible with his [or her] own culpable mental
state and with his [or her] own accountability for an aggravating fact or circumstance' . "
(citation omitted)); State v. Briggs, 197 P.3d 628, 632 (Utah 2008) ("An accomplice will be
held criminally responsible to the degree of his own mental state, not that of the princi-
pal.").
98. E.g., Montanez, 894 A.2d at 944 n.23 ("The fact that a person cannot be convicted
as an accessory to justified conduct, however, does not preclude the conviction of that per-
son, solely on the basis of his own culpability, of a substantive or inchoate offense arising out
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Similarly, defendants may be liable for attempt or the completed
crime if they know that the principal acts under a justification de-
fense founded on a reasonable mistake or if they wrongfully
created the occasion for actual justification.99 A defendant who cor-
rectly believes the principal's conduct is non-criminal need not rely
on the technicalities of aider and abettor law (that there is no
crime to aid and abet), but can be exonerated on the morally sig-
nificant basis of her own lack of mens rea. Similarly, the
implication that defendants aiding merely excused conduct have
no defense overlooks that those who reasonably believed they as-
sisted non-criminal conduct have a defense even if the principal is
liable. °0 What is determinative is not whether the principal wasjus-
tified or excused, but whether what the defendant believed was
going on amounted to a crime. Whether a principal or some other
actor was excused or justified will sometimes correctly resolve cer-
of the same incident." (citing Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 279-80 (1982))); MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(3) (1980) ("A person
who engages in conduct designed to aid another to commit a crime ... is guilty of an at-
tempt to commit the crime, although the crime is not committed or attempted by such
other person.").
99. See, for example, People v. Williams, 142 Cal. Rptr. 704 (Ct. App. 1977), which af-
firmed the murder conviction of a defendant who, during an unprovoked assault on the
victim, asked a third party to kill the victim. The killer (the defendant's sister) was acquitted
on the ground that it appeared to be lawful defense of a third party, yet the defendant was
liable. See also, e.g., People v. McCoy, 24 P.3d 1210, 1217 (Cal. 2001) ("[W]hen a person, with
the mental state necessary for an aider and abettor, helps or induces another to kill, that
person's guilt is determined by the combined acts of all the participants as well as that per-
son's own mens rea. If that person's mens rea is more culpable than another's, that person's
guilt may be greater even if the other might be deemed the actual perpetrator."); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.06(2) (1980) ("A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another
person when (a) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of
the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such
conduct.... ."); 2 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 94, § 6.8, at 160 ("For example, what if A shot
and killed B upon a reasonable but mistaken belief that such deadly force was necessary in
his own defense. This is clearly a defense to A, but should accomplice C, who aids A without
such a belief, thereby go free? If ... C gave aid with the intent that A kill B, it would seem
that C should not escape liability." (footnote omitted)); cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(4) (a)
(1980) (a person assisting a peace officer in an arrest that turns out to be unlawful has a
defense, "provided that he does not believe the arrest is unlawful."); Donald M. Zupanec,
Annotation, Acquittal of Principal, or His Conviction of Lesser Degree of Offense, as Affecting Prose-
cution ofAccessory, orAider and Abettor, 9 A.L.R.4TH 972 (1981 & Supp. 2009).
100. Montanez, 894 A.2d at 944 n.24 ("Even if a principal does not act in self-defense, an
accused accessory still may defend against an accessory charge by demonstrating that his act
of soliciting, requesting, commanding, importuning or intentionally aiding the principal
itself was committed in self-defense .... "); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (1980) (an
element of accomplice liability is that the defendant act "with the purpose of promoting or
facilitating the commission of an offense."); 2 LAFAVE & SCOTrr, supra note 94, § 13.3 ("But,
on this notion that 'the liability of each is measured by his or her own degree of culpability,'
an accomplice might well have a defense (e.g., self-defense) because of his or her own be-
liefs, without regard to whether the principal likewise has such a defense.").
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tain issues, but examination of the defendant's mental state and
conduct offers the doctrinally correct answer more often.
IV. REGULATING JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE BY CLASS
Professor Dressler has argued that the categories of justification
and excuse might be important because similar defenses should be
structured in similar ways. Perhaps all excuse defenses, for exam-
ple, should be affirmative defenses where the defendant bears the
burden of persuasion.
Once again, the premise may be questioned. Even if all excuse
or justification defenses had common philosophical roots, particu-
lar doctrinal conclusions would not necessarily follow. I draw this
inference from the codes based on principles of punishment. Even
widely accepted moral principles do not imply a specific criminal
code, except in the most general terms. Presumably almost every
plausible candidate for the best moral theory will require a code
prohibiting rape, robbery, murder, burglary, kidnapping and ar-
son. At some point, though, broad principles stop dictating details.
It is not so clear that an accepted moral theory will lead to an un-
ambiguous determination of, for example, whether the code
should criminalize using marijuana or alcohol, driving eighty miles
an hour on the highway or having sex with a seventeen-year-old.
Even in theory, many details are likely to be left to be fleshed out
by lawgivers in particular jurisdictions. Even substantial differences
in criminalization and punishment are not necessarily evidence of
either injustice or of non-compliance with the theory of punish-
ment.
If this is correct with respect to principles of criminalization,
there is no reason that it should not also be true of defenses. Some
defenses are likely to be implied by almost any moral theory; pre-
sumably no theory would categorically reject self-defense. However,
acceptance of a particular branch or mix of retributivism or utili-
tarianism does not inevitably lead to a specific conclusion on
whether, in a particular jurisdiction, the heat of passion defense
should be available: 1) only when the victim committed a criminal
act allowing the defendant to utilize non-deadly force, and the vic-
tim provoked the excessive force which caused the death; 2)
whenever there is a reasonable explanation or excuse, regardless of
the source of provocation or the identity of the victim; or 3) only as
a factor to be considered in a sentence for murder. None of these
choices are necessarily inconsistent with full acceptance of funda-
mental underlying principles. Even assuming for the moment that
Unjustified
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justification and excuse are operative and significant parts of the
theory of justice, many or most issues with regard to the details of
defenses must be resolved by reference to some set of reasons
other than that they are dictated by the theory of justice. If this is
right, then arguments about common treatment of defenses have
no claim to moral priority, but are ordinary arguments based on
logic and reason, entitled to prevail if they are persuasive, and oth-
erwise not.''
Professor Dressler proposes that the content of defenses might
be shaped by whether the defense is a justification or excuse. "A
plausible argument can be made for the rule that legislatures
ought to require the government to carry the burden of persuasion
regarding justification defenses, but that the defendant should
shoulder the burden with excuses."0 2 The rationale is that
"U]ustified conduct is lawful conduct .... With excused conduct,
however, all of the elements of the crime have been proved and the
conduct was determined to be unjustifiable.' 1 3 The premises of the
argument are debatable. Justification defenses are irrelevant-the
jury never considers the case-unless every element of the offense
can be proved primafacie,104 so this is not a distinction from excuse
defenses. In addition, that an excuse defense results in acquittal
does not necessarily mean that the conduct was in fact unlawful;
perhaps the decision maker accepted a definitive defense without
reaching the merits. In addition, the lower the defendant's burden
of proof, the more likely it becomes that defendants invoking justi-
fication defenses will be acquitted in spite of factual guilt. The
distinction also puts great weight on definitive and correct catego-
rization of defenses, an apparently intractable problem.
More fundamentally, if it is unjust to convict someone with a
valid excuse defense, it is not clear why there should be any differ-
ence in the methodology used to structure criminal defenses-it is
hard to simultaneously consider a defense mandated by the theory
101. Put another way, it would be bizarre for a theory to acknowledge that ajurisdiction
could permissibly choose to reject a particular defense entirely, or adopt it. But if it adopts
the defense, then the jurisdiction must determine the details of its elements by the implica-
tions of its classification as justification or excuse. That is, the concepts ofjustification and
excuse are not powerful enough to dispose of large questions, yet they are so powerful that
they dictate the answers to lesser questions.
102. Dressier, Justifications and Excuses, supra note 9, at 1172.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a) ("After the government closes its evidence or after
the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter ajudgment of
acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The
court may on its own consider whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.").
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of justice, and yet disfavored. 1 0 5 This is not to say that all defenses
should have the same procedural requirements, but now legisla-
tures and courts invoke general considerations of public policy-
who has access to the information, the risk of fabrication of
defenses, the consequences of erroneous denial, actual experience
with the defense in courts, and where the burden should be
allocated to facilitate accurate factual determinations. Put another
way, while likes should be treated alike, that does not answer the
question of whether the relevant similarity is categorization as ex-
cuse or justification, or some other similarity shared by particular
defenses.
It would not be outlandish to conclude that the prosecution
should bear the burden of disproving infancy but not insanity even
though both are excuse defenses. Infancy is usually readily deter-
minable on uncontroversial facts contained in government
records, while insanity is within the particular knowledge of the
defendant and is far more susceptible to fabrication. Perhaps the
prosecution should be required to disprove mistake of law though
it is usually characterized as an excuse, because the defense is
based on government-induced conduct-it is unseemly to have the
government induce conduct and then send you to prison unless
you can prove that your conduct was upright. Similarly, while law
enforcement is a justification defense, it might not be unfair to re-
quire a private citizen using deadly force to make an arrest of a
fleeing felon to prove the circumstances warranting it. Once again,
making arrests is justified conduct, yet society may not want to en-
courage casual use of deadly force, and those who engage in it may
reasonably be expected to explain their basis for action. While
none of these arguments are necessarily correct, if they are plausi-
ble they suggest that mere status as justification or excuse does not
necessarily dictate how the defense should be structured.
Indeed, while accepting Professor Dressler's belief that the cate-
gories can shape procedural requirements, Professor Fletcher
argues that requirements for justification defenses should be more
stringent because of the moral implication that justified conduct
was in fact good. If the person wants the benefit of a claim that
their behavior was praiseworthy, perhaps they should show that
105. Professor Robinson recognizes the importance of excuse defenses in a way that
suggests they should not be disfavored: "But the condemnatory function of the criminal law
is [an] important goal; and the condemnatory function is undercut when a blameless per-
son is punished. Convicting the truly irresponsible person taints the criminal law's
credibility, leaving it too weak in subsequent cases to effectively condemn where condemna-
tion is deserved." 1 ROBINSON, supra note 10, § 32(d).
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their conduct was indeed praiseworthy. Thus, in the case of prison
escape, Professor Fletcher explained:
There is every reason for courts to interpret the imminence
requirement more stringently in cases of justification. The
claim of lesser evils must be viewed as an instance in which the
individual citizen dares to override the legislative judgment
about what in general should constitute criminal conduct.
That the risk be imminent insures that the individual will in-
terpose his judgment against the legislature's only in cases of
inescapable emergency.
In cases of excuse, the requirement of imminence should be
applied more leniently, for the degree of impending danger is





At a minimum, the idea that defenses should be treated categori-
cally rather than individually should be advocated for empirically.
Assuming that the MPC defenses or those in a particular jurisdic-
tion are regarded as imperfect now, a researcher should reform
them both by putting them in categories and revising the catego-
ries, and also by revising them defense-by-defense. If categorical
treatment results in a more just, more administrable set of legal
principles, that would be strong evidence that the approach should
be replicated in other jurisdictions.
Professor Dressler also argues that the justification/excuse dis-
tinction has implications for whether defenses can be altered
retroactively. Since individuals are not urged to act on excuses, like
insanity, but are told to act on justifications, like self-defense, it
would not be unfair to repeal an excuse retroactively, but it would
be unfair to repeal a justification. l7 Leaving aside the doctrinal
question of whether something not punishable can retroactively be
made punishable based simply on an absence of reliance,"" it is not
clear that individuals do not rely on excuse defenses. Mistake of
law, for example, is an excuse defense with reasonable reliance as
an element... The heroic individual who commits a trivial crime
to avoid a credible threat to injure a stranger might rely on a du-
106. Fletcher, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions, supra note 9, at 1366-67.
107. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 9, § 17.05(f).
108. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) (holding that the statute of limitations
cannot be retroactively extended to revive time-barred charges); Carmell v Texas, 529 U.S.
513 (2000).
109. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) (b) (1980).
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ress defense,"O even though duress is often classified as an
excuse."' By the same token, justification defenses can sometimes
be altered without affecting reasonable reliance; for example, if a
Model Penal Code jurisdiction determined that justification de-
fenses would be taken away based on any form of negligence, not
just gross negligence, no one could claim that they relied on the
right to engage in an ordinary lack of due care when evaluating
whether to use deadly force in self-defense.
CONCLUSION
In jurisprudence and criminal law theory, there are valuable in-
sights and intellectual rewards flowing from exploration of the
nature of justification and excuse, independent of their utility for
the criminal justice system. However, for scholars of public policy
and legal doctrine, writing for and advising judges, juries, lawyers
and legislatures, something fails to cross the border between the-
ory and practice. Proposed definitions of justification and excuse
are clear enough, but those definitions do not correspond closely
to anything that happens in the criminal justice system. For quite
persuasive reasons of substantive justice, administrability and con-
stitutional tradition, in both statutes and verdicts, "justification"
defenses are available to many whose conduct was morally culpa-
ble, and those who avoid conviction based on "excuse" may be
factually innocent. The larger point is that a model that assumes
defenses should be structured to send precise moral messages is
unlikely to be useful to a system that uses defenses, and therefore
has designed them, primarily to assign criminal liability, leaving
final moral judgments of those found "not guilty," if they are to be
had, to other systems.
110. Some courts hold that threats to third parties can trigger a duress defense. See, e.g.,
People v. Coffman, 96 P.3d 30, 105 (Cal. 2004); Commonwealth v. Perl, 737 N.E.2d 937, 943
& n.13 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
111. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 9, § 17.05.
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